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COMMENTS 
Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors' 
Emergency Powers 
In times of natural catastrophe or civil disorder, immediate and 
decisive action by some component of state government is essential. 
The legislative police power can of course be exercised to deal with 
crises affecting the public health, safety, and welfare. In practice, 
however, the ravages of nature and the exigencies of rioting, labor 
strife, and civil rights emergencies usually necessitate prompt 
governmental response. Since the executive is inherently better able 
than the legislature to provide this immediate response, state chief 
executives have frequently been given substantial discretionary 
authority in the form of emergency powers to deal with anticipated 
crises.1 Consequently, when public emergencies arise, the center of 
governmental response is usually the governor's office. 
The primary source of executive emergency power is the state 
constitution, although statutes often codify the constitutional execu-
tive emergency authority and occasionally delegate additional legis-
lative police powers to the governor. Most governors are authorized 
to respond to public emergencies with a variety of extraordinary 
emergency measures. This study of state constitutional and statutory 
emergency power provisions has been undertaken in an attempt to 
evaluate the sources and scope of governors' emergency powers, as 
well as the limitations upon those powers. Its primary focus will be 
upon the extreme breadth of executive emergency authority and, in 
particular, upon the power to use military force during times of 
public emergency.2 
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Grants of Authority 
The prov1S1ons of state constitutions from which executive 
emergency powers are derived display a marked uniformity. Every 
1. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-341 to -346 (1956) (governor's civil defense 
powers); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 39.408-.409 (1962) (governor's civil defense powers); MICH, 
COMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948) (governor's emergency powers); ORE, REv. STAT, § 401.530 
(1963) (governor's emergency powers). 
2. The components of the state ,military forces are variously defined in the several 
states; .the component most frequently utilized by governors in public emergencies is 
the state "national guard"-the term used to identify the organized military force. 
E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 361 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 21.01 (1957). Typically, the 
"militia" is the unorganized body of individuals subject to state military service. E.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.1 (1948); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7-103(d) (Supp. 1964). Also, the 
statutes frequently authorize organization of a "state guard" when the state national 
guard is called into active federal service. E.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7-401 (Supp, 1964); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1151 (Supp. 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN, § 21.025 (1957). 
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state constitution confers the executive power upon a governor, or 
designates the governor as the chief executive officer of the state.3 
Every state constitution also designates the governor as commander-
in-chief of the state military forces.4 Furthermore, all constitutions 
except those of Massachusetts and New Hampshire explicitly charge 
the governor with the duty of faithful execution and enforcement 
of state law.5 In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, this duty can be 
implied from the required oath of offi.ce.6 In addition, thirty-five 
3. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113; ALASKA CONST. art. III. § 1; .ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 2; 
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. 4, § 4; DEL. CONST. 
art. III, § l; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3001; HAWAII CONST. art. 
IV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 6; IND. CONST. art. 5, '§ 1; IOWA 
CoNST. art. IV, § l; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3; KY. CONST. § 69; LA. CoNST. art. V, § 2; 
ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § l; Mo. CoNST. art. II, § l; MASS. CONST. ch. II, § I, art. I; 
MICH. CoNST. art. V, § l; MISS. CoNST. art. 5, § 116; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § l; MONT. 
CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEB. CoNST. art. IV, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, 
art. 41; N.J. CONST. art. V, § I, ~ l; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 
N.C. CONST. art. III, § l; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 71; Omo CONST. art. III, § 5; OKLA. 
CoNST. art. VI, § 2; ORE. CONST. art. V, § I; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. 
VII, § l; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § l; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 1; TENN. CoNST. art. III, 
§ l; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § l; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 3; VA. 
CONST. art. V, § 69; WASH. CONST. art. III,§ 2; w. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 5; WIS. CONST. 
art. V, § l; WYO. CoNST. art 4, § l; cf • .ARiz. CONST. art. V, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. V, 
§ 4. . 
4. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 131; ALAsKA CONST. art. III, § 19; .ARiz. CONST. art. V, § 3; 
.ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5; CoLO. CoNST. art. IV,§ 5; CoNN. CoNST. 
art. 4, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3010; 
HAWAII CoNST. art. IV, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14; IND. 
CONST. art. 5, § 12; IowA CoNST. art. IV, § 7; KAN. CONST. art. 8, § 4; KY. CONST. § 75; 
LA. CONST. art. XVII,§ 2; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 7; MD. CoNST. art. II, § 8; MASS. 
CoNST. art. of amend. LIV; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS. 
CONST. art. 5, § 119; Mo. CoNST. art. IV, § 6; MoNT. CoNST. art VII, § 6; NEB. CoNST. 
art. IV, § 14; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51; N.J. CONST. art. V, § I, 
~ 12; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 8; 
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 75; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 6; ORE. 
CONST. art. V, § 9; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 3; s.c. CONST. art. 
IV, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 7; 
UTAH CONST. art. VII,§ 4; VT. CONST. ch. II,§ 20; VA. CONST. art. v, § 73; WASH. CONST. 
art. III, § 8; w. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 12; Wrs. CONST. art. v, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. 
4, § 4, art. 17, § 5. 
5. ALA. CoNST. art. V, § 120; ALAsKA CoNST. art. III, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 4; 
ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2; CONN. CONST. 
art. IV, § 11; DEL. CoNST. art. III, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; GA. CONST. art. 
V, § 2-3011; HAWAII CONST. art. IV, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. V, 
§ 6; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 16; lowA CONST. art. IV, § 9; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3; KY. 
CONST. § 81; LA. CONST. art. V, § 14; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 12; MD. CONST. art. 
II, § 9; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 123; 
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6; NEV. 
CONST. art. 5, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ~ 11; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. CONST. 
art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 75; OHIO CONST. art. III, 
§ 6; OKLA. CoNST. art. VI, § 8; ORE. CONST. art. V, § 10; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; R.I. 
CONST. art. VII, § 2; s.c. CONST. art. IV, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 4; TENN. CONST. 
art. III, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10; UTAH CoNST. art. VII, § 5; VT. CoNST. ch. 
II,§ 20; VA. CONST. art. V, § 73; WASH. CONST. art. III,§ 5; W. VA. CONST. art. VII,§ 5; 
WIS. CONST. art. v, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 4. · 
6. MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 84. 
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constitutions explicitly authorize the governor to call out the state 
national guard to enforce the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel 
invasion.7 Of these thirty-five constitutions, only that of Arkansas, 
which restricts exercise of the governor's emergency power to those 
times when the legislature is not in session, contemplates legislative 
control of the manner in which the guard is to act.8 The slight 
variations of language which occur in the various provisions 
designating the purposes for which the guard may be called out 
appear to be of little consequence.9 Authority for calling out the 
guard "to enforce the laws" would seem to be sufficiently broad to 
permit the use of the guard in any public disorder or natural disaster 
attended by a crisis in local law enforcement. Of the fifteen state 
constitutions which do not confer upon the governor explicit consti-
tutional authority to call out the national guard, only one specifically 
prohibits such actions by the governor; the Tennessee militia cannot 
be called into service unless the legislature declares "by law, that the 
public safety requires it."10 In each of the other fourteen states, the 
governor's power to call out the national guard can be implied from 
his constitutional powers as chief executive officer of the state and 
commander-in-chief of the military forces, and from his constitu-
tionally imposed obligation to enforce the laws.11 The provisions 
conferring these general powers serve, in each of the fourteen states, 
as the bases for statutes explicitly authorizing the governor to call 
out the national guard.12 
7. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 131; ALASKA CONST, art. III, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. 11, § 4; 
COLO. CONST. art. IV,§ 5; FLA. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; HAWAII CONST. art. IV, § 5; IDAJIO 
CONST. art. IV, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. 
8, § 4; LA. CoNST. art. XVII, § 2; MD. CONST. art. II, § 8; MASS. CONST, art. of amend. 
LIV; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. 9, § 217; 
Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MoNT. CONST. art. VII, § 6; NEB. CoNST. art. IV, § 14; NEV, 
CONST. art. 12, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. 
XII, § 3; N.D. CoNST. art. III, § 75; Omo CoNST. art. IX, § 4; OKLA. CONST, art. 
VI, § 6; ORE. CONST. art. V, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; S.D. CONST, art. IV, § 4: 
TEX. CoNST. art. IV, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 4; VA. CONST. art. V, § 73; WASH. 
CONST. art. X, § 2; W. VA. CoNST. art. VII,§ 12: WYo. CONST. art. 4, § 4; art. 17, § 5. 
8. "The Governor shall, when the General Assembly is not in session, have power 
to call out the volunteers or militia, or both, to execute the laws, repel invasion, repress 
insurrection and preserve the public peace in such manner as may be authorized by 
law." ARK. CoNST. art. 11, § 4. 
9. Several states substitute other phrases for the phrase "to enforce the Jaws." 
E.g., LA. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 51. Other states add "suppress 
riots" or "preserve public peace" to the designated purposes. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 11, 
§ 4; MISS, CONST. art. 9, § 217; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. XII, § 3; 
S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 3. 
IO. TENN. CONST. art. Ill, § 5. 
11. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text. 
12. ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 26-172 (1956); CAL. MIL. 8: VET. CODE §§ 143, 146; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 27-16 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 171 (1953); GA. CODE ANN, 
§ 86-106 (1963); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29.7 (Supp. 1964); KY. REY. STAT. §§ 37.240, 38.080 
(1962); ME. REY. STAT. ANN. ch. 25, § 703 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:2-4 (Supp. 
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B. Limitations on Authority 
Although the constitutional and statutory provisions granting 
executive emergency authority do not restrict the mode of exercise 
of the military power after the state national guard has been ordered 
into emergency service, several state constitutions contain other 
provisions indicating that the state executive is not intended to have 
unlimited military powers in times of public emergency. The consti-
tutions of seven states provide that only those persons in the active 
service of the militia can be punished under martial law.13 The 
phrase "martial law" is indeterminate,14 however, and no cases have 
been found which construe its meaning in these particular constitu-
tional provisions. The provisions clearly indicate an intention not 
to allow the displacement of normal civil processes by the summary 
trial and punishment of civilians by military commissions;15 as a 
practical matter, however, the ambiguity of these constitutional 
provisions may minimize their effectiveness as limitations upon the 
exercise of executive emergency authority. 
A second type of restrictive provision, found in the constitutions 
of nineteen states, declares that the op~ration of the laws is to be 
suspended only by the legislature.16 On several occasions involving 
public emergencies, governors have suspended the operation of the 
civil laws and have substituted military enforcement of executive 
orders.17 The nineteen states which prohibit this practice have 
recognized the danger that a governor may use the existence of a 
public emergency as an excuse for imposing arbitrary restrictions 
upon rights established under the civil laws. The universal adoption 
of this constitutional prohibition would restrict to some degree the 
1964); N.Y. MIL. LAW art. I, § 6; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 1-311 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAws 
§ 30·2·6 (1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 601 (1959); W1s'. STAT, ANN. § 21.11 (1957). 
In Tennessee, despite the constitutional prohibition, see note 10 supra and accom-
panying text, a statute authorizes the governor to call out the national guard in times 
of public emergency. TENN. ConE ANN. § 7-106 (Supp. 1964). Compliance with the con-
stitution is sought by insertion of a proviso that the "militia" cannot be called out 
except by legislative command, ibid., with "militia" defined in the statute to exclude 
the state national guard. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-103(d) (Supp. 1964). 
13. ME. CONST. art. I, § 14; Mn. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 32; MASS. 
CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XX.VIII; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 34; s.c. CONST. art. I, 
§ 27; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 25; VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 17. See also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 18; 
w. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 12. · 
14. See generally FAIRMAN, THE LAw OF MARTIAL RULE 19-49 (2d ed. 1943); WmNER, 
A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 6-15 (1940). 
15. See FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 96-97. 
16. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 21; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 12; DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 10; 
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 26; KY. CONST., Bill of Rights § 15; 
ME. CONST. art. I, § 13; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 9; MASS. CONST., Decla-
ration of Rights art. XX; N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 29; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; OHIO 
CONST, art. I, § 18; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 12; S.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 13; S.D. CONST, art. VI, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 28; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 15; VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 7. 
17. See RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAw FAILS 85-113 (1939). 
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exercise of executive emergency authority, but it could not prevent 
all arbitrary and unreasonable emergency measures. For example, 
a court construing the prohibition might accept the dubious theory 
propounded by the West Virginia Supreme Court that even constitu-
tional guarantees are subject to suspension by executive order when 
the governor deems the danger to the state sufficiently great.18 Also, 
since the prohibition applies only to the total suspension of the 
operation of the civil laws, it would not seem to prohibit arbitrary 
emergency measures which supplement but do not suspend the 
operation of the civil laws. 
A third type of constitutional provision could theoretically serve 
as an effective limitation upon emergency use of military power by 
the executive. Every state constitution except that of New York 
declares that military power shall be subordinate to civil power.10 
In practice, however, these provisions have proved largely ineffective 
as limitations upon executive use of military force during public 
emergencies. A few courts did hold that state national guard forces 
could only assist civil officers in the enforcement of civil law, that 
troops so employed were subject to all the commands and prohibi-
tions of civil law, and that the military forces could not cope with 
public emergencies by means prohibited to civil authorities.20 How-
ever, subsequent statutes in the states whose courts espoused these 
restrictive views have granted substantially greater discretionary 
authority to military forces engaged in public emergency service.21 
18. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 523, 77 S.E. 243, 245 (1912). 
19. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 27; ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 20; Aruz. CONST. art. II, § 20; 
.ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 27; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; CONN, 
CONST. art. 1, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights § 21; 
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-119; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST, art. I, § 12; ILL. 
CONST. art. II, § 15; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 33; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 14; KAN. CONST., Bill 
of Rights § 4; KY. CONST. § 22; LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 17; MD. 
CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 30; MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XVII; 
MICH. Cc>NST. art. I, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 9; Mo, CONST, 
art. I, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 17; NEV, CONST. art. 1, 
§ 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26; N.J. CONST. art. I, ,r 15; N.M. CONST, art, II, § 9; 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. 
art. II, § 14; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 18; 
s.c. CONST. art. I, § 26; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 16; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 24; Tm.:. CONST, 
art. I, § 24; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; VA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 13; WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 18; w. VA. CONST. art. III, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 20; 
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 25. 
Provisions of this type appeared in the earliest of state constitutions. Both the 
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared 
that the military power should be held in strict subordination to, and be governed 
by, the civil authority. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 104, 109 (Commager 5th 
ed. 1949). The desire to subordinate military power is also expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence, which recites, as one reason for severance, that the king "·has affected 
to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." Id. at 101. 
20. See Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 
121 (1855); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924). 
21. See KY. REv. STAT. § 38.030 (1962); MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 33, §§ 40-43 (1961); M1cu, 
COMP. LAws §§ 32.40-.41 (1948). 
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Although these statutes do not overrule the prior judicial construc-
tions of the constitutional provisions, the constitutionality of the 
statutes would probably be upheld today under any one of a number 
of theories. For instance, in most jurisdictions the governor's broad 
power to use the national guard is not limited to merely assisting 
civil authorities by methods permissible under civil law. Instead, 
most governors have authority to order the guard to use whatever 
measures of force are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.22 
Other theories which would support the constitutionality of the 
statutes are based upon the doctrine that a governor's invocation of 
emergency military authority creates a state of qualified martial 
law.23 The characteristics of qualified martial law were set forth in 
an opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the 
validity of an order directing the state national guard to put an end 
to violence during a labor dispute: 
Order 39 was . . . a declaration of qualified martial law. 
Qualified in that it was put in force only as to the preservation 
of the public peace and order, not for the ascertainment or 
vindication of private rights, or the other ordinary functions of 
government. For these the courts and other agencies of the law 
were still open and no exigency required interference with 
their functions. But within its necessary field, and for the ac-
complishment of its intended purpose it was martial law with 
all its powers: The government has and must have this power 
or perish.24 . 
Courts upholding broad executive military authority under qualified 
martial law have found several ways to minimize the impact of the 
constitutional subordination of the military to the civil power. Some 
courts have found the necessary subordination in the mere fact that 
the national guard is subject to the direction and control of the 
22. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. 
Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934); In re 
Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); 
State ex rel, Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); Commonwealth ex rel. 
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); In re Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 
S.E. 1029 (1913); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912). 
23. See generally FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 80-94; WIENER, op. cit. supra 
note 14, at 11-15. Commentators have written much on the nature of qualified martial 
law, the contrast between absolute and qualified martial law, and the validity of 
acts of national guard forces during a state of qualified martial law. E.g., FAIRMAN, 
op. cit. supra note 14, at 28-49, 80-124; WIENER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 6-42, 62-102; 
Ballentine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal, 14 MICH. L. R.Ev. (pts. 
1 &: 2) 102, 197 (1915); Ballentine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority, 
24 YALE L.J. 189 (1914); Ballentine, Martial Law, 12 CoLUM. L. REv. 529 (1912); 
Isscks, The Executive and His Use of the Militia, 16 ORE. L. R.Ev. 301 (1937); Comment, 
1938 WIS. L. R.Ev. 314; Note, 31 IND. L.J. 456 (1956). 
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 170-71, 55 Atl. 
952, 954 (1903). 
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governor, who is the chief civil officer of the state.2G Other courts 
have based their conclusion on the theory that the paramount im-
portance of the defense of the 'state requires that the constitutional 
subordination of the military to the civil power yield when the threat 
to the state is sufficiently great.26 Only a small minority of courts 
have held that the broad executive military powers characteristic of 
qualified martial law are in conflict with the constitutional sub-
ordination of the military to the civil power.27 
C. Summary 
Constitutional limitations upon the role of military power in 
state government have not led to the imposition of restrictive criteria 
governing the use of executives' constitutional emergency powers. 
The absence of effective constitutional limitations has meant that in 
practice the exercise of the broad emergency powers is tempered 
primarily by executive self-restraint. Nevertheless, statutory provi-
sions and due process limitations do impose some degree of control 
upon the exercise of executive emergency authority. 
II. STATE STATUTES 
The statutes pertaining to governors' emergency powers are of 
two basic types: those which codify constitutional executive 
emergency authority and those which delegate to the executive addi-
tional authority based on the legislative police powers. No detailed 
survey of the statutes of all fifty states will be made here; instead, 
attention will be focused on several common patterns. 
Statutes cannot, of course, directly restrict the scope of constitu-
tionally granted executive emergency authority. In theory, however, 
the legislature could significantly guide the executive's use of his 
constitutional emergency power by articulating the conditions which 
call for the exercise of that power and suggesting the procedures 
and degrees of force appropriate to particular emergency conditions. 
Statutes delegating legislative police powers can restrict the scope of 
the power granted and delimit the conditions under which it is to 
be employed. 
A. Executive Military Authority 
In most states, legislation governing military affairs includes a 
codification of the governor's constitutional authority to call out the 
25. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 159, 85 Pac. 190, 193 (1905); Franks v. Smith, 142 
Ky. 232, 242, 134 S.W. 484, 488 (1911); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 462, 143 Pac, 
947, 949-50 (1914); see FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 97-98. 
26. See, e.g., In re :Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); State ex rel. Roberts 
v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 
206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903). 
27. Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121 (1855); :Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 
N.W. 278 (1924); cf. Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911). 
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national guard £or public emergency service. Whereas the constitu-
tions state general purposes £or which military force may be used,28 
the statutes enumerate in somewhat greater detail the emergency 
conditions which permit the governor to call out the national 
guard.29 Such a statutory classification of emergency conditions can 
be a useful guide to an executive faced with the decision whether 
to invoke his emergency powers in a given situation. Unfortunately, 
however, most statutes defining executive military authority do not 
suggest what procedures and degrees of force are appropriate to 
particular emergency conditions. The statutes generally reflect the 
view that the severity of response to public emergencies is a matter 
to be left solely to the governor's discretion. 
In many states, the legislation fails to indicate what relationship 
exists between the national guard on emergency duty and the local 
civil authorities.ao In several states, however, some guidance is 
provided by statutes which authorize civil authorities to designate 
the objectives to be attained, while national guard officers select the 
means to achieve those ends.a1 
Statutes frequently permit the governor to declare a state of 
insurrection82 or of martial law.as The two declarations appear to 
have the same significance, differing only in their terminology. Of 
the statutes which grant such authority, only two include a definition 
of martial law.84 In the absence of definitions and judicial interpre-
28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
29. See, e.g., CAL. MIL. &: VET. CODE .ANN. § 146; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.83 
(1963); MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.40 (1948); N.Y. MIL. LAW .ANN. art. I, § 6; OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. §§ 5923.21-.22 (Baldwin 1964); S.C. CODE § 44-114 (1962); Wrs. STAT • .ANN. 
§ 21.11 (1957). A typical statute provides: 
In event of war, insurrection, rebellion, invasion, tumult, riot, mob or body 
of men acting together by force with intent to commit a felony or to offer violence 
to persons or property, or by force and violence to break and resist the laws of 
this state, or the United States, or in case of the imminent danger of the occur• 
rence of any of said events, or whenever responsible civil authorities shall, for 
any reason, fail to preserve law and order, or protect life or property, or the 
governor believes that such failure is imminent, or in the event of public disaster, 
the governor shall have power to order the organized militia • . . [into active 
service]. 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 38.08.040 (1958). 
30. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 26-172 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 27-16 
(1958); N.Y. MIL. LAW ANN. art. I, § 6; N.D. CODE .ANN. § 37-01-04 (1960); VA. CODE 
.ANN. § 44-75 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT • .ANN. § 21.11 (1957). 
31. E.g., !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.85 (1963); MASS. ANN. LAWS tit. V, § 43 (1961); 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 32.41 (1948); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5923.23 (1954); cf. VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 606 (1959). 
32. E.g., CAL. MIL. &: VET. CoDE ANN. § 143; N.D. CooE .ANN. § 37-01-08 (1960); 
S.C. CODE § 44-122 (Supp. 1964). , 
33. E.g., N.Y. MIL. LAw ANN. art. I, § 6; ORE. REV. STAT. § 399.065 (1963); R.I. 
GEN. LAws .ANN. § 30-2-5 (1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-1-8 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 38.08.030 (1958); W. VA. CODE ch. 15, § 1195 (1961). 
34. The Alaska and Washington statutes define a state of complete martial law, 
which permits the governor to supersede the civil authority by the military forces for 
a limited time, and a state of limited martial law, which entails only a partial subordi-
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tations, the extent of the military authority which may be exercised 
pursuant to a declaration of martial law or insurrection is uncertain. 
The terms of the provisions and the context in which they are found 
often suggest that when a declaration is made the governor may 
employ whatever measures of force are necessary to restore order.M 
The declarations under this type of statute would therefore appear to 
carry with them the attributes of qualified martial law.36 
B. Executive Civil Defense Authority 
Civil defense statutes enacted in many states confer broad 
emergency authority upon the governor.37 The legislation supple-
ments, but does not restrict, other constitutional and statutory 
executive military powers. 38 Civil defense legislation does, however, 
frequently impose limitations upon the exercise of the emergency 
powers which it grants. These statutes often provide that the 
emergency powers do not arise until a civil defense emergency is 
proclaimed.39 Many statutes limit the definition of a "civil defense 
emergency" to emergencies created by war, enemy attack or threats 
thereof, or natural disaster;40 others define "civil defense emergency" 
in terms sufficiently broad to include riots and other instances of civil 
disorder.41 The exercise of the governor's powers is sometimes 
limited by the authority of a civil defense advisory council,42 but 
most civil defense legislation gives the governor wide discretion in 
selecting the appropriate response to a civil defense emergency.48 
nation of the civil to the military. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 26.05.090 (1962); WASH. REV, 
CODE § 38.08.030 (1958). 
35. The California statute, for example, authorizes the governor to declare a 
state of insurrection and then order the national guard into active service under the 
command of officers he selects. This power is granted in addition to ·his power to 
call out the national guard for public emergency service, and resistance to military 
authority during a state of insurrection is a crime. CAL. MIL. &: VET. CoDE ANN, 
§§ 143, 145, 146. 
36. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-342 (1956); CONN, GEN, STAT, ANN, 
§§ 28-9, -11 (1960); N.D. CoDE ANN. § 37-17-06 (Supp. 1965); VT, STAT, ANN, tit. 20, 
§ 9 (Supp. 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.01(4), .02(1) (Supp. 1965). 
38. See 25 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 114 (1952). 
39. See statutes cited note 37 supra. 
40. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-342 (1956); CONN, GEN. STAT, ANN, § 28·9 
(1960); N.D. CODE ANN. §§ 37-17-06, -16 (Supp. 1965); Rl. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 30-15-14, 
-15 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-142.2 (1953). 
41. CAL. MIL. &: VET. CODE ANN. § 1505; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 22.02 (Supp. 1965), 
The California code excludes labor strife from the definition of emergency. CAL, 
MIL. &: VET. CODE ANN. § 1505. 
42, E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 11 (1959). Civil defense advisory councils, created 
in many states, constitute forums which may render useful guidance to governors 
during emergencies. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODE § 77-1305 (1956); N.C. GEN, STAT. § 166· 
4 (1964); VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4 (1959). 
43. See statutes cited note 37 supra. 
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C. Special Executive Emergency Authority 
The governors of Michigan, Florida, Georgia, and South Caro-
lina are ~anted special statutory emergency powers supplementary to 
their military and civil defense powers.44 The statutes in those states 
permit the governors to proclaim a state of emergency and pro-
mulgate regulations which have the force of law during the public 
emergency.45 The Michigan statute specifically permits these regula-
tions to apply to the use of both public and private property, and to 
the conduct of private citizens.46 In contrast, the only regulations 
specifically authorized by the statutes of Florida and Georgia are 
those affecting only public property;47 however, the governors of 
those states, as well as of South Carolina, have the power to employ 
whatever measures of force they deem necessary in public emer-
gencies. 48 Such measures could, no doubt, affect private as well as 
public property, and the conduct of private citizens. The statutes, 
which impose no restrictions on the measures of force which the 
governors may apply and leave the determination of the restrictive 
measures solely in the governor's discretion,49 clearly reflect a legis-
lative intent to vest extremely broad public emergency powers in 
the governors.60 Although the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina 
statutes designate numerous means for enforcing the restrictive 
measures, there is no requirement that the governors use less drastic 
civil enforcement means before resorting to military force.61 
Two conclusions can be drawn concerning state constitutional 
and statutory executive emergency powers. First, most governors 
have extremely broad authority to cope with problems of natural 
disaster and civil disorder. Second, in some states emergency powers 
may be exercised only during certain kinds of crises, but the consti-
tutions and statutes which grant the powers do not restrict the mode 
of their exercise. 
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, §§ 14.021-.022 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-211 to -217 
(1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 10.31-.33 (1948); S.C. CODE §§ 1-128 to -130.3 (1962). 
45, FLA. STAT • .ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(1) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-213 (1957); 
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 10.31, .33 (1948); see S.C. CoDE §§ 1-129 to -130 (1962). 
46. MICH. COMP, LAws § 10.31 (1948). 
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(1) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-213 (1957). 
48. "(I) The governor is hereby authorized and empowered to take such measures 
and to do all and every act and thing which he may deem necessary ••• to order 
and direct any individual person, corporation, association or group of persons to 
do any act • • • or • • • to refrain from doing any act • • • .'' FLA. STAT. .ANN. 
tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961). See GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 40-211, -212 (1957); S.C. CODE § 1-130 
(1962). 
49. All of the statutes permit the governor to employ whatever measures he deems 
necessary. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961); GA. CoDE ANN. § 40.211 (1957); 
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 10.31 (1948); S.C. CoDE § 1-128 (1962). 
50. See FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IV, § 14.021(4) (1961); MICH. COMP. LAws § 10.32 (1948); 
s.c. CODE § 1-130.3 (1962); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-216 (1957). 
51. See FLA. STAT • .ANN. tit. IV, § 14.022 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 40.216 (1957); 
S.C. CODE § 1-130.1 (1962). 
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III. THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXERCISE OF 
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS 
A. Judicial Review 
[Vol, 64:290 
Broad emergency powers of unrestricted application are easily 
abused; on numerous occasions the existence of a public emergency 
has resulted in the denial of private rights and individual liberties.52 
At the beginning of this century, attempts were made to subject the 
use of executive emergency powers to judicial control.Gs Effective 
judicial controls were not imposed, however, because of the wide-
spread judicial acceptance of doctrines of qualified martial law and 
because of the discretionary nature of the powers. Because governors' 
declarations of emergencies under civil defense and emergency power 
statutes are discretionary acts not subject to judicial injunction or 
invalidation, i;,1 and because of the refusal of courts to review gov-
ernors' declarations of martial law, proclamations of insurrection, 
3:nd calls for national guard troops,55 attention has been shifted to 
the judicial review of particular acts ordered by executives during 
public emergencies. In Moyer v. Peabody,56 the plaintiff, a labor 
leader, had been arrested and detained without trial by state military 
forces throughout the course of a violent labor dispute in a Colorado 
mining region. After his release he brought a suit for damages 
against the governor, alleging that he had been deprived of liberty 
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the 
action, suggesting in sweeping terms that the governor was the sole 
judge not only of the necessity for proclaiming a state of insurrection, 
but also of the appropriateness of the specific measures to be taken 
to restore order.57 · 
Moyer v. Peabody undoubtedly inspired the rash of subsequent 
52. See RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 65-113. 
53. E.g., In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); Commonwealth ex rel, 
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va, 
759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914). 
54. See statutes cited notes 37, 45 supra. 
55. E.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F, Supp. 
355 (S.D. Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 867-68 (D. Minn, 
1934); Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933). To a great 
extent, these refusals to review governors' orders were occasioned by interpretations 
of 'the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. '78 
(1909), discussed in text accompanying notes 60-62 infra. , 
56. 212 U.S. 78 (1909). 
57. "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that 
they are needed in• order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge 
and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office •••• When it comes 
to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary 
rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment." 
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909). Cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I, 
45 (1848). 
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state-court refusals to review the propriety of measures used in good 
faith by governors to cope with public emergencies.58 Neither state 
nor federal due process requirements were thought to impose any 
significant limits upon the exercise of executive emergency author-
ity59 until the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Sterling v. Constantin60 in 1932. In that ~ase, the Supreme Court 
stated that although the governor's proclamation of martial law is 
conclusive and permits him a wide range of discretion to deal with 
public emergencies, 
it does not follow ... that every sort of action the Governor may 
take, no matter how unjustified by the exigency or sub.versive 
of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise 
available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat .••. 
What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and 
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, 
are judicial questions.61 
The propriety of judicial review of executive emergency measures, 
once established in federal courts by the Sterling decision, soon be-
came recognized in state courts as well.62 Nevertheless, some courts 
today might still refuse to review emergency acts explicitly authorized 
by statute.63 
B. The Standard of Due Process 
When executive emergency authority is invoked, the citizens 
affected may complain in court that the emergency measures ordered 
by the governor deprive them of their personal or property rights 
without due process of law. Ordinarily, courts find compliance with 
due process if the restriction complained of is reasonably necessitated 
by the public emergency and sufficiently related to the object of 
securing peace and order.64 Whether there has been compliance with 
58. E.g., State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933); State ex rel. 
Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912). 
59. See In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 
Pac. 706 (1899); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914). But see Herlihy 
v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164 (1916); Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 
143 Pac. 947 (1914). 
60. 287 U.S. 378 (1932). 
61. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932). 
62. E.g., Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933); 
Hearon v. Caius, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935). 
63. "It seems to be well established in this State that the courts have no jurisdic-
tion to review any action performed by a governor under the power conferred upon 
him either by the Constitution or legislative enactment. Mandamus will not lie to 
compel action on his part, nor will an injunction be issued to restrain such action." 
Born v. Dillman, 264 Mich. 440,444,250 N.W. 282, 283-84 (1933). 
64. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Wilson &: Co. v. Freeman, 179 
F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. 
Minn. 1936); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile 
Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934). 
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due process requirements is most easily ascertained when only a 
single emergency measure has been taken. For example, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court found that seizure of the plaintiff's oil wells 
was not a reasonably necessary measure, because there was no show-
ing that the plaintiff had violated production quotas set by law.Oil 
However, the standard of due process becomes more difficult to apply 
when multiple restrictions are imposed and attacked. Even if all of 
the restrictions relate directly to securing peace and order, the court 
faces a formidable task in determining the reasonable necessity for 
a. particular measure. It must assess not only the need for the 
particular restriction but also the efficacy of the restrictions which 
would remain if the challenged one were invalidated. 
When a court finds an emergency measure unduly restrictive, and 
further determines that the other measures in force are sufficient to 
deal with the emergency, it faces the additional problem of deter-
mining the scope of its decree. The court might enjoin application 
• of the restriction to a single complainant, or it might order relief 
from the measure in somewhat broader form. Limiting the decree so 
as to benefit only the single complainant preserves the viability of 
the emergency restriction for appropriate later applications, but 
requires that all other affected individuals seek the desired relief in 
time-consuming and expensive litigation. A broader judicial decree 
could protect all adversely affected individuals, but might also pre-
vent a necessary application of the measure in a subsequent situation 
arising out of the same emergency. 
C. Judicial Determinations of Due Process 
The due process clause has occasionally been used to challenge 
the deprivation of personal liberty and property during times of 
public emergency. The two leading United States Supreme Court 
decisions involving personal liberty and property rights are, respec-
tively, Moyer v. Peabody and Sterling v. Constantin. As has already 
been mentioned,66 in Moyer v. Peabody the Supreme Court held that 
the detention of a labor leader during the course of a labor dispute 
did not deprive him of liberty without due process of law, even 
though he was not charged with any crime during or after the period 
of detention. Subsequently, numerous state courts upheld the use 
of similar detentions by the military, and even sanctioned trial of 
civilians by military commissions.67 However, military trials of 
civilians may be a thing of the past, except under actual conditions 
65. Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P.2d 582 (1933). 
66. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. 
67. E.g., United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb, 1922); 
United States ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S.D. Tex. 1920); In re Jones, 
71 W. Va. 567, 77 S:E. 1029 (1913). 
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of war. The cases upholding such trials.have been severely criticized,68 
and the United States Constitution has been construed to prohibit 
both Congress and the President from authorizing military trial of 
civilians.69 Furthermore, seven state constitutions preclude punish-
ment of civilians by martial law.70 Military detention of civilians is 
also of dubious validity today, except, perhaps, when the detention 
is for a short period of time and is justified by the impracticality 
of immediately transferring the individual to the civil authorities. 
Another use of military detention has been to quarantine an indi-
vidual guilty of no crime but whose mere presence in the vicinity 
was deemed likely to incite further disorder.71 The expanding scope 
of fourteenth amendment due process, as demonstrated in Sterling v. 
Constantin, strongly suggests that state executives no longer have 
the unrestricted discretion to order military detention of civilians.72 
Restrictions upon the exercise of property rights frequently ac-
company the abridgment of personal liberty during public emer-
gencies.78 After Sterling v. Constantin established the principle that 
the denial of property rights by executive emergency measures may 
be deemed a violation of due process, several cases have found certain 
emergency restrictions on property rights violative of due process.74 
Three Minnesota cases involving the forced closing of business 
operations during labor disputes illustrate the application of the 
standard of due process to emergency restrictions on property rights. 
In Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson,75 disputes between employers 
and truck drivers had led to a strike and to violent prevention of 
truck movements. Since the civil authorities were unable to control 
the violence, the governor declared martial law and ordered the 
militia to enforce regulations promulgated to restore order. One of 
the emergency measures decreed by the governor and upheld by the 
federal district court was an order prohibiting the complainant 
68. FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 167-71. See also ANTHONY, HAWAII UNDER 
ARMY RULE (1955). 
69. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See generally 
Bishop, Court Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids-Retired Regulars, 
Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1964). 
70. See constitutions cited note 13 supra. 
71. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 
355 (S.D. Ind. 1935). 
72 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
73. For example, during the steel strike -of- 1937 th~- governors of Ohio• and 
Pennsylvania ordered certain steel mills closed, see RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 17, 
at 165-72; during a violent labor dispute in 1955 in New Castle, Indiana, the use of 
property and the exercise of personal rights were both restricted. See 31 IND. L.J. 
456 (1956). -
74. Wilson &: Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting 
Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936); Russell Petroleum Co v. Walker, 162 
Okla. 216, 19 P .2d 582 (1933); cf. Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 Pac. 164 
(1916). -
75. 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934). 
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employer from operating his trucks. A crucial factor in the deter-
mination that the measure was reasonable was that the acts of 
violence and destruction involved were not focused at one particular 
· location but were directed at mobile personal property; because 
strikers could interfere with the-trucks anywhere along their routes, 
law enforcement officers could not effectively prevent the unlawful 
ac_ts except by stopping the traffic altogether. 
In two subsequent Minnesota federal district court cases, Strut-
wear Knitting Co. v. Olson16 and Wilson & Co. v. Freeman,71 Powers 
Mercantile was distinguished on its facts. In both Strutwear and 
Wilson, mob violence flared when employers attempted to continue 
business operations during strikes at their factories. Local authorities, 
unable to quell the disturbances, requested aid from the governor, 
and on each occasion the governor ordered out the national guard, 
whose commanding officer ordered the factories closed. In both 
instances, the employers successfully sought injunctions prohibiting 
further interference with their constitutional right to use their prop-
erty. In Strutwear the court stated that interference with the em-
ployer's right to use his plant was unnecessary and unjustified 
because other means of preventing the violence had not been 
exhausted.78 In Wilson the court stated: 
[WJe cannot subscribe to the principle or doctrine that a Gov-
ernor of a state may bow to the demands of a law-violating mob 
that a plant under strike shall be closed when neither the local 
nor State authorities have used all the means available to them 
to suppress the mob by invoking enforcement of the laws of the 
State enacted to be enforced under such circumstances .... [lJt · 
would be a shocking reflection on the stability of our State 
Government if the State could not quell the mob action in 
Freeborn County without declaring martial law and decreeing 
the deprivation of constitutional rights of those who are the 
victims of the lawlessness.79 
D. The Essex Wire Corporation Dispute 
The difficulty of determining the necessity for emergency restric-
tions is well illustrated by recent events at Hillsdale, Michigan. The 
International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers be-
gan a strike at the Hillsdale plant of the Essex Wire Corporation in 
February 1964. From its inception, the strike was attended by de-
struction of company property and harassment of supervisory and 
other non-union personnel who were attempting to maintain pro-
duction. A temporary restraining order prohibiting the IUE from 
76. 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936). 
77. 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959). 
78. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384, 390-91 (D. Minn. 1936). 
79. Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp.'520, 527-28 (D. Minn. 1959). 
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engaging in acts of violence and interfering with entrance to and exit 
from the plant was issued. by the county judge, who later revoked 
the order and disqualified himself.80 In response to demands from its 
insurers, Essex hired armed guards to protect its property and 
workers. 81 Local courts and other civil authorities continued to 
function normally, but Essex complained that neither local nor 
state authorities took positive action to halt the strikers' acts of 
violence.82 
On two successive days state and local police were forced to spend 
several hours dispersing mobs which surrounded the county jail 
after police detained several participants in picket line fracases.83 
Hillsdale authorities then requested assistance from the governor, 
who quickly proclaimed a 'state of public emergency.84 Pursuant to 
the Michigan emergency powers statute,85 the governor promulgated 
regulations, violation of which was a misdemeanor.86 The emergency 
proclamation directed the Commissioner of the State Police to pro-
hibit (I) the possession or carrying of dangerous weapons within the 
city except by law enforcement officials and the national guard; (2) 
unlawful traffic within the city; (3) movement within the areas sur-
rounding the Essex plant and the city power plant except by those 
with lawful business to conduct; (4) occupation or use of the Essex 
plant; and (5) picketing, demonstrations, and assemblies at public 
places in Hillsdale. 87 
The governor also ordered national guard troops into Hillsdale 
to assist the Commissioner of the State Police in enforcing the regu-
lations. 88 With the arrival of the first of approximately one thousand 
armed and uniformed Michigan National Guardsmen, the violence 
ended, the picketers dispersed, and the plant was closed. Shortly 
thereafter, the governor amended the prior regulations, allowing the 
plant to reopen and permitting peaceful picketing by no more than 
five persons.89 The amendment also imposed a curfew on all public 
streets within the county and extended the bans on dangerous 
weapons and unlawful traffic to the entire county.9° Four days later 
80. Detroit News, March 2, 1964, p. 11-B, col. 6; id., March 4, 1964, p. 6-A, col. 3. 
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306 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:290 
these restrictions were withdrawn.91 Following settlement of the 
strike,. the state of emergency was declared ended, all emergency 
regulations were rescinded, and the troops were withdrawn from 
Hillsdale. 92 
It is arguable that none of the restrictions imposed by the gov-
ernor's emergency regulations were reasonably necessitated by the 
circumstances in Hillsdale. The only support for this view, however, 
is the retrospective observation that the stationing of a thousand 
national guardsmen in Hillsdale might have been sufficient in itself 
to control the disorder. Moreover, a court reviewing the necessity 
for emergency measures would have to recognize two important 
factors. First, at the time the measures were promulgated the gover-
nor had no assurance that national guard aid to the civil authorities 
would end the crisis without further violence. Second, all of the 
restrictive measures imposed were specifically authorized by statute.08 
It would not have been difficult for a reviewing court to find 
sufficient disorder in Hillsdale to justify resort to some emergency 
measures. Nevertheless, it would have been difficult to hold that all 
the restrictions imposed were necessary during the entire period 
they were in effect. 
Particularly questionable was the governor's order closing the 
Essex factory.94 Essex was engaged in lawful business activity on its 
property. The violence and harassment on the part of the strikers 
appears to have been directed at forcing Essex to end its lawful but 
unpopular manufacturing practices. In determining whether closing 
the plant was reasonably necessary, a reviewing court could properly 
have given weight to the fact that the emergency measures did not 
first attempt to restrict the destructive activities of the strikers before 
depriving Essex of the right to make a lawful use of its property. 
According to the Strutwear and Wilson decisions, the closing of the 
plant deprived Essex of its property without due process, since the 
governor did not exhaust all available means for controlling unlaw-
ful conduct before ordering the factory closed. 
JV. CONCLUSIONS 
Constitutions and · statutes confer upon governors extremely 
broad executive emergency authority. The mode of exercising that 
emergency authority is rarely subjected to effective limitation by 
constitutional, statutory, or judicial power. The fourteenth amend-
ment and state constitutional guarantees of due process may limit the 
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exercise of emergency powers, but the case-by-case determination of 
the propriety of emergency measures is likely to cause irrevocable 
denial of individual rights in many cases. The need for broad execu-
tive emergency authority to cope with crises does not preclude statu-
tory specification of the procedures to be followed in exercising 
emergency powers. Carefully drafted emergency power legislation, 
permitting the exercise of only that degree of authority which the 
circumstances require and directing that the lesser measures of 
force be employed initially, would help to protect against needless 
encroachment upon individual constitutional rights. 
F. David Trickey 
